Spectral hide and seek: Uncovering radar ECM fundamentals and testing

Show notes

In modern warfare, the ability to detect, evade, and manipulate radar systems has become a cornerstone of tactical advantage. The battlefield is constantly evolving, with electromagnetic spectrum dominance playing an increasingly vital role. But how do military forces effectively test these advanced electromagnetic countermeasures (ECM) and ensure their systems perform under real-world conditions? In this episode, we'll explore the fundamentals of radar ECM, the significance of spectrum testing, and how modern electromagnetic support and countermeasure testing solutions are shaping the future of defense technology. Our guest is Leander Humbert, Technology Manager Radar & EW, Rohde & Schwarz.

Show transcript

00:00:02: Welcome to Signals, the defense podcast from Rohde &

00:00:08: Schwarz.

00:00:16: I'm your host, Dennis P. Merklinghaus, sitting here with my co-host, Kadir Aydin.

00:00:20: Hi, everyone.

00:00:22: And today's topic is Spectral Hide-and-Seek, uncovering radar ECM fundamentals and testing.

00:00:31: Now, dear listener, have you ever wondered how armed forces can detect and track targets in the most hostile environments,

00:00:38: how they can outsmart enemy radar systems and stay one step ahead of the game?

00:00:45: Yes, the answer lies in the electromagnetic countermeasures. And today we have an expert with us.

00:00:50: It's Leander Humbert.

00:00:51: Maybe you can introduce yourself shortly, Leander.

00:00:54: Hello, everybody.

00:00:55: My name is, as being said, Leander Humbert, and

00:00:57: I'm the technology manager at Rohde & Schwarz, for radar and EW testing, and I'm very happy to be here to this day.

00:01:06: Excellent. As you, dear listener, might have seen in the past few years, the battlefield has dramatically changed.

00:01:15: Yes.

00:01:16: I mean, if you look at it, it is always about the spectrum dominance. And that means you need to be aware of what is happening. And you meet on the other side, you need to be able to control what the adversary is seeing. And

00:01:30: that is often the key in the decisions that are made on the battlefield lately.

00:01:35: So we are observing changes in the battlefield, and we have been talking about this

00:01:39: in our previous episodes. The spectrum is being more and more important, and we are claiming to be experts in the field of true spectrum dominance.

00:01:49: Dominating the whole chain of

00:01:51: signals.

00:01:51: If we're talking about true spectrum dominance, then our understanding is that we are not only generating and sending, transmitting, receiving these signals, but also testing is part of it.

00:02:05: And today with Leander here, we could maybe have a highlight on this topic. Leander,

00:02:09: so what can you tell us about the testing of such signals?

00:02:13: I think you had a good start on that one. I mean, if you look at the spectrum, first, you have to be aware of what is happening.

00:02:19: I mean, that is the classic field of electronic support measurements, which are an interesting but totally different story.

00:02:26: So I'd like to focus today on electronic countermeasures and especially later on electronic countermeasures testing. And

00:02:36: to understand how to test or what can be tested, I think it is important to understand what is the aim of electronic countermeasures. And of course,

00:02:49: it's most often it's a self-protection measurement. So

00:02:53: in contrast to ECM, where it's about situational awareness or where it is about giving information to other measurements that they can operate. ECM is making sure that you make your mission and

00:03:11: you make it alive. And you make it out alive.

00:03:12: Exactly. Yeah. Bringing the soldiers back home. Yeah,

00:03:16: absolutely.

00:03:17: And when you look at the adversary that you have for electronic countermeasures, and we're talking about radars here, not communications so far.

00:03:29: The thing is, what information can a radar extract from a given target? And

00:03:35: that information simply being is radio detecting and ranging.

00:03:39: But it also gives you information about the velocity. It gives you information about the spatial domain. What angle you are,

00:03:47: what elevation, what athmos you are.

00:03:50: And these are, let's say, the key information that a radar can extract.

00:03:55: And the other side, the electronic countermeasures, try to obscure or even change the information that the radar can extract here.

00:04:05: So not directly

00:04:06: jamming.

00:04:08: You're touching the point of terms which we didn't introduce yet, but like spoofing.

00:04:12: Exactly.

00:04:13: Yeah, I mean, that you have to differentiate a little. You're right. On the one side,

00:04:17: you have jamming. And jamming is the brute force approach

00:04:21: that you try

00:04:22: to bring in a lot of power into the radar receiver to obscure or to mask the actual radar target or the radar echo coming from an aircraft or whatever the target is at the end. Which is, as I said, it's brute force and it's noticeable by the operator and which would open another discussion point where you have a lot of good electronic protection measures or electronic countermeasures.

00:04:51: When you know that you are being jammed, simplest one would be changing the frequency, that you're going to a frequency that is not as much as jammed as your channel that you're operating right now.

00:05:02: On the other side, you have deception, which

00:05:05: is much more subtle, which tries to change the information, which not tries to mask you on the side. Now, possibly you do as well.

00:05:17: You can mix it, but you want to provide wrong information to the radar system. And that is what I meant before.

00:05:24: You can try to provide a false range.

00:05:31: This is the classical domain of, let's say, techniques like radar range gate pull off, where you simply provide a wrong ranging information to the radar in hopes that when you are too far off, that the receiver or the gate tracking of the radar drops you. And the third domain that you can do jamming, of course, is speed. And speed, especially, let's say, in the most lethal phase of the intercourse when a missile is on its way. And

00:06:02: normally a missile is not as stupid that it goes straight directly to the intercept point, but it has very good calculations to maintain its kinetic energy.

00:06:13: And all these calculations are based on the speed of the target, which are extracted from Doppler domain, from spectral shifts that the target echo induces into the return signal.

00:06:25: If you're going for jamming, and jamming is not as efficient as it was in the past because you really, really need to have a lot of power. Because most modern radars work with a lot of dedicated electronic protection measurements, starting with matched filtering.

00:06:44: That means that basically you have to have, let's say, a very good correlation function to what you send out

00:06:51: to be bringing any energy into the receiver. And jamming using white noise or whatever is not coherent.

00:07:00: That means versus noise,

00:07:02: radar systems are quite good shielded.

00:07:05: You have additional protection measures that are also used, for example, in communication, like frequency hopping. Normally, if you want to jam a radar, and in contrast to communication, radars are absolutely wideband.

00:07:20: If you're looking at the latest generation of radars, we're talking about six gigahertz of bandwidth that they're not using instantaneously. They're using one waveform, but where they can jump in between. And that means you need to cover that with power,

00:07:35: with energy for jamming. And that means you

00:07:39: would block a complete bandwidth of frequencies, which could harm yourself as

00:07:44: well.

00:07:44: Yes, that is the one side. But the other side is the spectral power decreases the wider you get.

00:07:50: I mean, at the end, it's always power per hertz that you have. And when you get wideband for jamming, that means normally your power level drops. And that makes it easier for the radar system to detect its own signal.

00:08:05: But I like your point, Kadir,

00:08:07: because we at Rohde & Schwarz, we dominate the complete chain of signals. So that means we can also disrupt signals.

00:08:14: How do we make sure that we don't disrupt our own signals,

00:08:17: our own communications?

00:08:20: That's a very fair point. And it's

00:08:22: actually it's not that easy. I mean, with jamming,

00:08:27: you possibly know what areas you are jamming and hopefully you put your sensors in a frequency of operation that is not being jammed.

00:08:37: So there you can do a lot with spectrum management. When it comes for deception or spoofing, as you said,

00:08:47: then it's a little bit more complicated, because if you do that, you're simulating a signal that is very similar to the radar, because it's the purpose of looking similar and inducing wrong information.

00:09:00: And that puts up a very interesting aspect. If you're looking for a combined air operation where you have several aircraft flying along

00:09:08: and then you have electronic support measurement receivers and then one starts to jam with a signal that looks very similar to the radar on the

00:09:17: ground. And

00:09:18: that might lead to, let's say, an indication of a threat at the position where

00:09:24: no threat is. And

00:09:25: that would be a bridge for saying, OK, that needs to be tested as well, which is also tied to communication, because if you want to avoid such situations, you need to have,

00:09:37: I don't know

00:09:38: if you talked in the past about the combat cloud or something like

00:09:41: Yeah.

00:09:41: that.

00:09:41: Yeah.

00:09:42: And that brings you to the point that the platforms in between each other have to communicate and say, I'm jamming here. That is not the adversary. That is me. Don't be afraid.

00:09:52: So

00:09:52: integration is key.

00:09:54: All these systems work with each other smoothly.

00:09:58: And is the term blanking a term which we can use in this aspect?

00:10:04: I would say it was.

00:10:07: In the past it was. Why I wouldn't say it is any longer or not with the hoping that we had in the past is radar systems or let's say all emitters, whether this is radar or communications, proliferated and got more complex.

00:10:28: So if you look at nowadays platforms, you have so many different RF services, let's call it like that, on board.

00:10:38: If we're talking about the naval platform,

00:10:40: you have different areas of communications in different bands.

00:10:44: You have different data links. You have a lot of sensors for different purposes and so on and so on.

00:10:51: That is the one thing. So you have more density of different emitters on a platform on the one side.

00:10:58: And each and every of these emitters getting more complex, especially if you're looking at radars.

00:11:03: As I said, they are getting much more wide band. They are having much higher duty cycles.

00:11:09: That means even if they are pulsed, yeah, that means they have a lot much longer on time. And when you simply dealing with planking or with planking

00:11:20: tagging or something like that, that would mean that you severely cut down on the performance of the systems because you have to plank so, so much. And

00:11:32: that comes to the point where spectrum management on a platform in between jamming sensors and so on and so on, is more about, let's say, a cognitive approach into managing these kinds of resources, which can't be done as easy with an on and off link.

00:11:52: That is the point.

00:11:54: And especially, which is something we possibly can talk about later, when you think about all the new radar approaches that come up.

00:12:03: Cognitive radar,

00:12:06: where you have a given data set where you can assume, okay, if you have this set of parameters, you have that radar. Because a cognitive radar doesn't have a given set of modes.

00:12:22: It changes over the course of the interaction. So that makes it very, very hard to do,

00:12:29: let's say, this resource management of who is able to transmit, who is allowed to receive, when, at what frequency and so on

00:12:39: and so on. It's

00:12:39: going to be hard.

00:12:41: And I think that is where testing comes into play. Exactly.

00:12:45: So we come to the point. Exactly. So that was

00:12:49: the thing that I was going to ask.

00:12:50: So let's talk about the testing part, because we also have experience and expertise in that area. And I cannot imagine that

00:13:00: you would test a jammer or whatever kind of signal generator.

00:13:04: You wouldn't test it in the city, because you don't want to disturb any other signals.

00:13:09: How does the testing really look like?

00:13:12: Yeah. I mean, one reason you gave why you don't want to test it in the city.

00:13:18: Another thing is, and it's different to testing, let's say, electronic support measurements.

00:13:24: Because electronic support measurements, in contrast, are a little bit easier, simply because you're testing emitters.

00:13:36: For identifying an emitter, you only need to know what the emitter is transmitting.

00:13:42: That means you need to go somewhere, do an ELINT operation and get all the parameters of the transmitter of the radar system.

00:13:51: And then you have a description that you can use into your electronic support equipment, a library or whatsoever. And then you need to make sure in testing that this library with a given dataset works out.

00:14:06: For ECM, it's a little bit more complicated, because here you need to know the radar system. You need to understand the receiver. And the receiver is nothing that ELINT provides. And

00:14:20: therefore, for me, it's always important to make clear that there is a difference between verification and validation of the techniques that you're transmitting for jamming or for deception and assessment of the effectiveness of the technique.

00:14:39: The first thing is rather easy. And that is where I say that is where test and measurement equipment is used most often.

00:14:48: And that is when you have an understanding of a radar system that you want to jam or deceive. You set up a threat library or a jamming library. And

00:15:02: then you want to make sure that the jamming techniques that come out of your transmitter are exactly what you programmed. So

00:15:13: you want to make sure that if you have an RGPO, that it makes a successive delay of the pulse to whatever distance or so on. And you want to make sure that this is what you set in the library.

00:15:28: So it's about validation.

00:15:30: The other way, does it have an effect

00:15:33: on the radar system is

00:15:35: a totally different approach. And

00:15:39: the best way to do it is actually having the real system. Because even if you could say you can model a radar system,

00:15:48: let's say you're doing a software approach, saying you're doing a software description, a model description of your technique, and you're having a description, a software description, a model of the radar's signal processing. But that works on assumptions.

00:16:04: That leaves out effects that you only have when you have the real radar system that you can't anticipate before. So that being said, assessing the effectiveness of a jamming,

00:16:20: you can try to do something in the lab, but it never gives you the confidence that you would have when you're testing against the real system. For me, the focus is clearly on validation of the programmed techniques. And as you mentioned before, interoperability.

00:16:39: So how does it behave with different sensors on the platform?

00:16:43: How does it behave in between different platforms?

00:16:48: And if you're still having a system that works on blanking, does the blanking operate? Something like that.

00:16:57: Or how well, I mean, as I mentioned, electronic protection measure is frequency agility, meaning hopping.

00:17:04: So one key question of, is my jammer fast enough to follow the hopping of the radar? So

00:17:12: these are questions that can be answered in the lab. Not if, let's say, the given system has this and this effect by using this and this technique. You can assume, but at the end, it works on assumption.

00:17:25: It's nothing that you can prove.

00:17:28: How exactly do our testing solutions support the way of testing? Like

00:17:33: we have signal generators and this kind of equipment.

00:17:36: How

00:17:37: do these products and solutions contribute to the testbed?

00:17:41: Mm-hmm.

00:17:43: I mean, the signal generators are, let's say, in that aspect similar to what you can do for electronic support measurements.

00:17:53: You can provide the environment, the signal environment, and you can simulate the radar signals. So

00:18:03: you're modeling a system and that signal you can provide to your digital radio frequency memory, which is the core of, let's say, modern jamming systems.

00:18:20: And then, as I said, it's about validating what this DERFM does with the signal.

00:18:28: And that means you need to compare the input signals. So how does my radar signal or my simulated radar signal look like

00:18:36: and what does my DERFM do with it?

00:18:39: And that is you need to have some receivers in the back end.

00:18:42: And that brings me back to the start. You have multiple domains that you try to manipulate the radar system and these domains need to be tested. And mainly that's time domain and that's frequency

00:18:55: domain. And every radar, whether this is a pulsed radar or an FMCW radar, every radar operates on runtime measurements. So all of them are time-based when it comes to detecting the range of a target. And

00:19:12: on the other side, it's about spectrum.

00:19:15: It's about the frequency, so Doppler shift and so on, frequency agility and so on. And a third, let's call it domain.

00:19:25: It's not so much of a domain, but more, let's say, more sophisticated use of the spectrum is what are the modulations that you have?

00:19:33: What happens to coherency of the signals?

00:19:38: Normally a pulse is not only, let's say, a CW pulse, but you have modulation on it. And that gets more and more complicated. So

00:19:48: the complexity of the signals increase

00:19:50: and a radar system takes this complexity to make sure that it can operate.

00:19:58: It's an electronic protection measurement at the end of the day. And you need to make sure that your jamming maintains that phase information, that modulation on pulse, for example. And that is where I'd say you have different approaches.

00:20:16: I had a couple of discussions in the past about that. I mean, classically for time domain,

00:20:21: you could utilize an oscilloscope where you have multiple channels comparing, let's say, before and after jamming, where you can really see the range gate pull off, phasing out from the echo target and so on and so on. On the other side, the classical approach for everything spectral would be a spectrum analyzer. But the borders in between the instruments are shifting a little bit.

00:20:53: We now lately had a launch of the FMWX, which is a multi-channel spectrum analyzer. And these channels are also phase coherent, so similar to an oscilloscope.

00:21:06: And so what to use here?

00:21:10: I would advise having a look at the spectrum analyzer for both time and spectral domain simply for one reason.

00:21:21: And that is dynamic range.

00:21:24: When you're doing kind of jamming or rather deception, you normally try to start with very low power levels to look similar to your own target echo. And then you're increasing the power level of the signal. And that means you possibly need to have a high dynamic range.

00:21:45: The same is on the reception side. You might have so many different signals coming to the ESM system, to the jammer, that are much different in power level. And

00:21:58: therefore, that could be an advantage using a spectrum analyzer over a scope, even when it comes to time domain measurements. But nevertheless, it's always very dependent on the system or the device on the test here.

00:22:12: Interesting.

00:22:15: Okay. I would like to ask my favorite or one of my favorite questions.

00:22:18: It's always about AI.

00:22:19: So AI is the new technology now. Everyone is talking about it.

00:22:24: Is AI also somehow in the area of radar? So

00:22:29: do modern radars use AI? And if yes, how do we react to that?

00:22:35: Yeah. Welcome back to the cat and mouse game. Yeah,

00:22:39: of course. Of course. I mean, cognitive radar,

00:22:41: I mentioned them previously,

00:22:43: don't need to operate in given modes. Normally in the past,

00:22:49: if you have an adaptive radar,

00:22:50: that means, okay,

00:22:52: I have this situation. I

00:22:54: use these radar parameters. But still, there were deterministic radar parameters that are being used.

00:23:01: Cognitive radars simply do a channel measurement, if you call it like that, and then adopt their mode, their waveform, everything.

00:23:11: They have so many degrees of freedom. And that is a huge challenge. And

00:23:15: it will be much more in the future, starting with electronic support measurements. And

00:23:19: if you don't have any specific parameter that you can look for, for identification of an emitter, you're having a hard time. And that means

00:23:31: the only way to deal with cognitive, so AI-driven radars.

00:23:35: I mean, there are other domains where AI can be used for radars, like resource management.

00:23:43: But the only way to deal with it, having cognitive or AI-based approaches in EW as well. Because if you don't have any definitive data sets to look for, you need to learn on the spot out of physics a little bit. Because that is something you can't change.

00:24:06: A radar has a purpose. And that purpose is highly tied to its parameters.

00:24:11: But that is going to be a huge challenge, especially coming back to this for testing.

00:24:17: How do you test an ESM system

00:24:21: that doesn't work

00:24:23: on parameters? You need to have a dynamic approach for testing, for testing cognition, because

00:24:31: cognition in that regard is highly dynamic.

00:24:35: And coming back to countermeasures. At that point, countermeasures are all about support measures, or let's say the intelligence behind it.

00:24:45: Because that is something you always want to have when you're doing deception.

00:24:50: You want to know what the radar is doing next so that you can do it before that. And that is going to be very hard.

00:24:58: That is going to be a huge challenge where I think test and measurement in development, but as well in research that is going on, is crucial.

00:25:10: To have an understanding,

00:25:13: does this work out?

00:25:15: In short, we could say that we could answer AI by implementing AI.

00:25:21: Yes.

00:25:22: Perfect.

00:25:24: Well, dear listener, what we heard today was that radar

00:25:27: ECM is a critical component of modern warfare. And its importance will only grow in the future.

00:25:34: Thank you very much, Leander, for being here with us.

00:25:37: It was a pleasure.

00:25:39: If you liked this episode, please like, share, repost and comment. Basically, whatever you like to do on social media or the such.

00:25:47: Tune back in next time.

00:25:49: We'll continue to deep dive into the exciting technology world of Rohde & Schwarz. Hear you later.

00:25:56: Bye.

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